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Abstract— A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of 
mobile nodes that communicate with each other by forming a 
multi-hop radio network. Security remains a major challenge 
for these networks due to their features of open medium, 
dynamically changing topologies, reliance on cooperative 
algorithms, absence of centralized monitoring points, and lack 
of clear lines of defense. Design of an efficient and reliable node 
authentication protocol for such networks is a particularly 
challenging task since the nodes are battery-driven and 
resource constrained. This paper presents a robust and 
efficient key exchange protocol for nodes authentication in a 
MANET based on multi-path communication. Simulation 
results demonstrate that the protocol is effective even in 
presence of large fraction of malicious nodes in the network. 
Moreover, it has a minimal computation and communication 
overhead that makes it ideally suitable for MANETs.  
Keywords-mobile ad hoc network (MANET); multi-path 
communication; security; certificates;, dynamic source routing 
(DSR) protocol; trust. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
A MANET is a collection of wireless hosts that can be 
rapidly deployed as a multi-hop packet radio network 
without the aid of any established infrastructure or 
centralized administrator. Such networks can be used to 
enable next generation battlefield applications, including 
situation-aware systems for maneuvering war fighters, and 
remotely deployed unmanned micro-sensor networks. 
MANETs have some special characteristic features such as 
unreliable wireless media (links) used for communication 
between hosts, constantly changing network topologies and 
memberships, limited bandwidth, battery, lifetime, and 
computation power of nodes etc. While these characteristics 
are essential for the flexibility of MANETs, they introduce 
specific security concerns that are absent or less severe in 
wired networks. MANETs are vulnerable to various types of 
attacks. These include passive eavesdropping, active 
interfering, impersonation, and denial-of-service. Intrusion 
prevention measures such as strong authentication and 
redundant transmission can be used to improve the security 
of a MANET. However, these techniques can address only a 
subset of the threats. Moreover, they are costly to implement. 
The dynamic nature of MANETs requires that prevention 
techniques should be complemented by detection techniques, 
which monitor security status of the network and identify 
malicious behavior. 
One of the most critical problems in MANETs is the 
security vulnerabilities of routing protocols. A set of nodes 
in a MANET may be compromised in such a way that it 
may not be possible to detect their malicious behavior 
easily. Such nodes can generate new routing messages to 
advertise non-existent links, provide incorrect link state 
information, and flood other nodes with routing traffic, thus 
inflicting Byzantine failure in the network. Several secure 
routing protocols have been proposed for MANETs based 
on cryptographic mechanisms [1]. Almost all of them 
assume the existence of a secure channel through which a 
security association has been established between the source 
and the destination. However, the prerequisite for such a 
secure channel to exist is the existence of a security 
association. This creates a routing security interdependency 
cycle [2].  
In this paper, an efficient key exchange protocol is 
proposed for MANETs that can be easily integrated with a 
routing protocol thereby providing an integrated framework 
of routing and security and solving the routing security 
interdependency cycle. The main contributions of the paper 
are as follows: (i) it presents a reliable and efficient key 
exchange protocol for MANETs, (ii) the protocol is based on 
multi-path communication, and therefore, it is robust even in 
presence of malicious nodes in the network, and (iii) the 
protocol involves minimal computation overhead and is ideal 
for resource-constrained nodes in MANETs. The rest of this 
paper is organized as follows. Section II presents some 
related work in MANET security. Section III describes the 
proposed protocol. Section IV provides performance 
evaluations of the protocol through simulations. Finally, 
Section V concludes the paper while highlighting some 
future scope of work.  
II. RELATED WORK 
The problem of security and cooperation enhancement 
among the nodes in a MANET has received considerable 
attention by the researchers over the last decade. 
Cryptography remains the most widely proposed solution to 
provide authentication for nodes. However, cryptography 
assumes safe key-exchange, which is particularly difficult to 
realize in open multi-hop network communications where 
attackers may launch man-in-the-middle attacks.  
Zhou et al. have introduced a threshold cryptography-
based key management scheme for MANETs [3]. A group of 
n servers together with a master public/private key pair are 
first deployed by a certificate authority (CA). Each server 
has a share of the master private key and stores the key pairs 
of all nodes. The shares of the master private key are 
generated using threshold cryptography. Thus only n servers 
together can form a complete signature. If any node wants to 
join the network, it must first collect all of the n partial 
signatures. Then the node can compute the complete 
signature locally and get the certificate. This scheme has 
been extended in a mechanism proposed by Kong et al. [4], 
where a centralized dealer is introduced to issue certificates 
and private key shares to t nodes during the network 
bootstrapping phase. A threshold cryptography system is 
deployed in order to provide a (t, n) secret sharing service. 
Any t nodes can form a centralized dealer and can issue or 
revoke certificates. In this scheme, any node that is willing to 
join the network will have to collect t partial signatures in its 
local communication range. Although, this scheme, to some 
extent, can handle the issue of nodes’ joining and leaving the 
network, it increases the risk of leaking of the private key of 
the centralized dealer. In the event of t nodes being 
compromised, the security of the entire network will be in 
jeopardy.  
Montenegro et al. have proposed a statistically unique 
and cryptographically verifiable (SUCV) identifier scheme 
in which the nodes compute their addresses applying a non-
reversible hash function on their public key [5]. Any node 
can then directly bind a public key to its owner address and 
an IP can not be spoofed without the associated private key. 
This provides a reliable authentication scheme for the nodes 
in a MANET. 
 Hubaux et al. have proposed a self-organized public key 
infrastructure-based trust building scheme [6] for MANETs 
by adapting pretty good privacy (PGP) protocol [7]. 
However, unlike in PGP, in this scheme, there are no central 
certificate directories for distribution of certificates. In order 
to find the public key of a remote user, a local user makes 
use of Hunter Algorithm [6] on the merged certificate 
repository to build certificate chain(s). A certificate chain 
initiates from the local user’s certificate and terminates at the 
remote user’s certificate. The probability of finding such a 
certificate chain in this scheme is high, but it is not 
guaranteed. Although the scheme is very suitable for 
decentralized networks like MANETs, it leads to disclosure 
of too much information about the originating nodes, as it 
releases several unnecessary certificates. 
Eshenaur et al. have proposed a trust establishment 
mechanism in which a node in a MANET can generate trust 
evidence about any other node [8]. In this scheme, when a 
principal node generates a piece of trust evidence, it signs 
the evidence with its own private key, specifying the lifetime 
and makes it available to others through the network. A 
principal may revoke a piece of evidence it produced by 
generating a revocation certificate for that piece of evidence 
and making available to others at any time before the 
evidence expires. A principal can get disconnected after 
distributing trust evidence. Similarly, a producer of trust 
evidence does not have to be reachable at the time its 
evidence is being evaluated. Evidences can be replicated 
across various nodes to guarantee availability. Although the 
scheme is conceptually sound, the authors have not provided 
any details about the performance evaluation of the scheme. 
Abdul-Rahman et al. have proposed a distributed trust 
model - a decentralized approach to trust management that 
uses a recommendation protocol to exchange trust-related 
information [9]. The model assumes that relationships are 
unidirectional and exist between and two entities (nodes). 
The entities make judgments about the quality of a 
recommendation of trust, based on their policies, i.e., they 
have values for trust relationships. The recommendation 
protocol works by requesting a trust value in a trust target 
with respect to a particular classification. After getting an 
answer, an evaluation function is used to obtain an overall 
trust value in the target node. The protocol also allows 
recommendation refreshing and revocation, and is suited for 
establishing trust relationships that are less formal and 
temporary in nature.  
Asokan et al. have introduced several password-based 
key exchange methods to set up a secure session among a 
group of nodes without any support infrastructure [10]. In 
this scheme, only those nodes that know an initial password 
are able to obtain the session key. The session key is formed 
by combinations from all the nodes in the network. The basic 
working principle of the scheme is as follows. A weak 
password is sent to the group members. Each member then 
contributes to generation of part of the key and signs this 
data by using the weak password. Finally, to establish a 
secure session key, a secure channel is derived without any 
central trust authority or support infrastructure. 
Stajano et al. have introduced the resurrecting duckling 
security protocol to establish trust in ad hoc networks [11]. 
The protocol is particularly suited for devices without 
display and for embedded devices that are too weak for 
public key operations. The fundamental authentication 
problem is solved by a secure transient association between 
two devices establishing a master-slave relationship. It is 
secure in the sense that the master and the slave share a 
common secret. The protocol is transient because the master 
at any point of time can terminate the association.  
Repantis et al. have proposed a decentralized trust 
management middleware for ad hoc, peer-to-peer networks 
based on reputation of nodes [12]. The reputation 
information of each peer is stored in its neighborhood and 
piggybacked on its replies.  
Patwardhan et al. have proposed a trust-based data 
management scheme in which mobile nodes access 
distributed information, storage and sensory resources 
available in pervasive computing environment [13]. The 
authors have taken a holistic approach that considers data, 
trust, security, and privacy and utilizes a collaborative 
mechanism that provides trustworthy data management 
platform in an ad hoc network. 
Baras et al. have proposed a trust management scheme 
for self-organized ad hoc networks, where the nodes share 
trust information only with their neighbors [14]. For 
establishing and maintaining trust among the neighbors, the 
authors have proposed a voting mechanism. This voting 
mechanism has made the scheme robust. 
Chang et al. have proposed a trust-based scheme for 
multicast communication in a MANET [15]. In a multicast 
MANET, a sender node sends packets to several receiving 
nodes in a multicast session. Since the membership in a 
multicast group changes frequently in a MANET, the issues 
of supporting secure authentication and authorization in a 
multicast MANET is very critical. The proposed scheme 
involves a two-step secure authentication method. First, an 
ergodic continuous Markov chain is used to determine the 
trust value of each one-hop neighbor. Second, the node with 
the highest trust value is selected as the certificate authority 
(CA) server. The analytical trust value of each mobile node 
is found to be very close to that observed in the simulation 
under various scenarios. The speed of the convergence of the 
analytical trust value shows that the analytical results are 
independent of the initial values and the trust classes. 
Sun et al. have presented trust as a measure of 
uncertainty [16]. Using the theory of entropy, the authors 
have developed techniques to compute the trust values from 
certain observations. In addition, trust models- entropy-based 
and probability-based, are presented to solve the 
concatenation and multi-path trust propagation problems. 
Sen et al. have proposed a self-organized trust 
establishment scheme for nodes in a large-scale MANET in 
which a trust initiator is introduced during the network 
bootstrapping phase [17]. The authors have also proposed a 
distributed trust-based intrusion detection system for 
MANETs based on cooperation among nodes [18]. 
However, most of the above-mentioned key management 
protocols have limitations. In the distributed CA scheme 
involving threshold cryptography, the trust between a new 
node willing to join the network and t existing nodes in the 
network can be established by out-of-bound physical proofs, 
such as, human perception or biometrics. However, these 
methods are not very practical in real-world scenario. It may 
be very difficult, if not impossible, for a node to acquire t 
existing nodes in the network in its neighborhood for 
evaluation of its trust. Alternatively, there must be off-line 
trust establishment mechanism between the new node and t 
existing nodes. In an infrastructure-less ad hoc network 
environment, this may also be very difficult to realize in 
practice. Moreover, threshold cryptography-based schemes 
have high communication and computation overhead [19]. 
In self-organized schemes, trust is established through 
off-line trust relationships among the nodes. These off-line 
trust relationships are generated from general social 
relationships. The initialization process depends on the issues 
of certificates among the nodes themselves and formation of 
a network of trust relationship between them. This process is 
very complex and slow in practice, because every issued 
certificate will require close contact between a pair of nodes. 
Moreover, ad hoc networks are formed at random by 
member nodes, and the trust relationships among the 
members are much sparse than those of general society. 
III. PROPOSED KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL 
The proposed protocol integrates a key exchange 
protocol with routing in a MANET and thus solves the 
routing-security interdependency cycle [2]. The objective of 
a routing protocol is to establish a path between a source 
node and a destination node. To achieve this objective, the 
reactive routing protocols for MANETs broadcast a route 
request message in the network so that the route to the 
destination may be discovered. The proposed key exchange 
protocol utilizes this approach to retrieve the public keys of 
the nodes. To find a certificate of a public key, the source 
node floods the network with a certificate request that is 
replied either by the target node or by an intermediate node 
that has a valid certificate of the public key of the target 
node. The proposed protocol is secure against malicious 
attackers that may try to distribute spurious certificates in the 
network and cause routing disruption. To make the protocol 
robust and reliable, two approaches are taken: (i) multi-path 
certificate exchange and (ii) trust-based certification. The 
details of the algorithm are described below.   
A. Description 
In the proposed protocol, it is assumed that every node in 
a MANET first generates a public/private key pair.  Since 
this key pair is generated by the node itself, the node needs 
to authenticate with some members in the network before it 
can join and access network resources. This authentication is 
based on a certificate exchange. The authentication is 
mutual. Thus, if a node S receives the public key of a node 
D, S issues a certificate for D’s public key. In turn, D also 
issues a certificate for S’s public key. In the rest of the paper, 
the set of nodes that has certified for node S’s public key is 
denoted as K(S). As the authentication is mutual, every node 
in K(S) has its public key certified by S. 
 
 
Figure 1. Certificate level multi-path and routing level multi-path 
Although the approach of multi-path has not been widely 
used in certificate exchange schemes for MANETs, it can 
greatly improve the reliability of a certificate exchange 
protocol. In designing the proposed protocol two types of 
multi-path message exchanges are distinguished: (i) multi-
path certificate exchange and (ii) multi-path routing. In 
multi-path certificate exchange, the public key of a node is 
certified by different nodes (Figure 1 (a)). Due to multiple 
independent certifications, the confidence assigned to these 
certificates is higher. A formal computation of the trust 
values for the certificates may be done using Dempster-
Shafer theory [6]. Figure 1 (b) shows an example of a multi-
path routing, where a node sends a certificate for another 
node through multiple node-disjoint paths. Since paths do 
not have any common node, a malicious node can at most 
prevent a certificate exchange but cannot spoof the identity 
of another node during the certificate exchange process. 
The proposed protocol also utilizes a trust management 
mechanism [20] to keep track of certification operations. The 
trust value of a certificate issuing node increases as more 
number of nodes confirm the public key for which the 
certificate is issued. On the other hand, when it is detected 
that a node has issued a spurious certificate, the trust 
assigned to the node will be decreased and all subsequent 
certificates issued by the node will also have less confidence 
associated with them. Consequently, if there is a conflict 
between certificates, the public key certified by the more 
trustworthy node(s) will be accepted as genuine.  
B. Operations 
1. Initialization: In the proposed protocol, before a node 
enters the network, it generates a public/private key pair. As 
a node joining for the first time attempts to get several 
certificates for of its PK from the existing nodes, it floods the 
network with a certificate request (CREQ) message. 
 
 
Figure 2. The use of intermediate nodes for certification 
2. Certificate exchange: Before requesting the node D’s 
certificate, the node S evaluates the minimum trust value that 
is required to consider the public key of D as reliable. This 
threshold value of trust is called the minimum public key 
trust value (MPKTV). This evaluation is local and based on 
S’s security requirements. Node S then broadcasts a CREQ 
for D’s certificates including D’s address, the list of nodes 
K(S). The CREQ is sent with a small time to live (TTL) to 
reduce communication overhead of the protocol.  Every 
intermediate node I that receives the CREQ checks the 
public key of D and searches its own certificate list.  
If I has no certificate for D, or if it already replied to the 
CREQ, it simply forwards the packet. Otherwise, I sends a 
certificate reply (CREP) to S containing a certificate of D’s 
public key signed by I (Figure 2(a)). If I does not know S, it 
constructs a self-signed certificate and informs S that it wants 
to make a certificate exchange (Figure 2(b)). This packet is 
sent through multiple node-disjoint paths to S. If I has a route 
to D in its cache, it informs D that S has requested its public 
key. D responds and requests a certificate for S’s public key. 
Since I and D can authenticate each other, the 
communication between D and I can be made secure by 
using I's signature. Therefore, no node can corrupt the 
certificate of S issued by I. If D does not know sufficient 
number of nodes, it replies to the CREQ itself. 
S repeats the operation with an increased TTL until it 
receives the required minimum number of certificates for 
D’s public key. After receiving the certificates, S sends the 
first packet to D which includes the list of nodes which has 
provided the certificates for D’s public key.  In this way, D 
gets the information about the known certifiers of S. Once 
they have exchanged their public keys, S and D issue 
certificates for each other. This certificate exchange protocol 
can now be directly applied in routing as S and D do not 
have to execute any expensive route discovery procedure for 
routing.  
3. Certificate revocation: As authentication is mutual, 
nodes maintain a list of certifiers. An implicit revocation 
scheme [6] is adopted, where each node periodically updates 
its public key by communicating secure certificate exchange 
messages with its peers. 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Simulation parameters 
An extensive simulation has been carried out on the 
proposed scheme to evaluate its performance in different 
network conditions and topologies. The proposed scheme is 
implemented on network simulator ns-2. The simulation was 
carried out on an abstracted MANET that consisted of 100 
mobile nodes distributed over an area of 1500 m x 1500 m. 
The duration of simulation was 120 s. Random way-point 
model has been chosen for node mobility pattern with 
maximum speed of a node as 10 m/s and average host pause 
time of 30 s.  During each simulation, five communication 
sessions were established that require certificate exchanges 
among the nodes. The dynamic source routing (DSR) 
protocol was used as the routing protocol [21]. For each 
configuration, 10 simulations runs were executed and the 
computed average value is taken as the final observation.  
The following three metrics are studied:  
(1) Valid public key acceptance rate: it is the ratio of the 
number of valid public keys accepted and the total number of 
public keys requested for by the nodes in the MANET. 
(2) Corrupted public key acceptance rate: it is the ratio of 
the number of corrupted public keys accepted and the total 
number of public keys requested for by the nodes in the 
MANET. 
(3) Delay: it is the interval between the time a request is 
sent for a public key and the time when the public key is 
accepted as valid.  
In the simulation, attacks are simulated where the 
attacker nodes send spurious certificates to the nodes which 
have requested for those certificates. These attacks can be 
isolated attacks where every attacker certifies a different 
public key. However, the attackers may also launch a 
cooperative attack where a group of attackers collude and 
send certifications for the same public key that is spurious. 
Both these types of attacks- isolated and collusion- are 
simulated. The percentage of attacker nodes is varied from 
0% to 40% of the total number of nodes in the network. 
Node initialization at the network bootstrapping phase is not 
simulated. It is assumed that each node has successfully 
executed the initialization step by exchanging requisite 
number of certificates with the honest nodes in the network. 
The number of certificate exchanged during the initialization 
is varied from 0 to 20 for each source and destination. A trust 
value of 0.75 is assigned to a node that is authenticated 
during the initialization step, while other nodes are assumed 
to have a trust value of 0.5. MPKTV is varied from 0.5 to 
0.9.  
 
Figure 3. Public key acceptance rate for varying number of attackers 
The number of certificate exchange during the 
initialization varies from 0 to 20 for each source-destination 
pair. A trust value of 0.75 is assigned to any node 
authenticated during the initialization, while a value of 0.5 is 
assigned to other nodes. The MPKTV varies form 0.5 to 0.9. 
B. Analysis 
1. Isolated attackers: Figure 3 depicts the variation of the 
valid public key acceptance rate and the corrupted public key 
acceptance rate with varying number of attackers. The 
MPKTV is kept constant at 0.5 while the number of attackers 
is varied from 0 to 40. There was no initial trust between any 
pair of nodes in the network. It is observed that the rate of 
valid public key acceptance falls rapidly as the number of 
attacking nodes increases. The trend is just the reverse for 
the rate of corrupted public key acceptance rate.  Since there 
was no initial trust at the initial stage, no intermediate node 
could issue a certificate for a requesting node. Only the 
destination node could reply to a CREQ message. With the 
increase in number of attacking nodes, there is a higher 
probability that an attacker sends a reply to a CREQ 
message. Since MPKTV is taken 0.5, every public key is 
considered as valid and accepted by the requester. For higher 
values of MPKTV, no public key is accepted since no node 
has sufficient trust level for issuing an acceptable certificate. 
Figure 4(a), (b) and (c) show the valid public key 
acceptance rate with 5, 10 and 20 known nodes in the 
network respectively for different values of MPKTV. It is 
observed that except when MPKTV = 0.5, the acceptance 
rate is as high in all cases.  It has also been observed that the 
acceptance rate of valid public key increases by 10% when 
the number of initially known nodes is increased form 5 to 
10 and then from 10 to 20. With more number of nodes 
initially known, more nodes send replies to a CREQ 
message, the average trust in a CREP message increases and 
thus more public keys are accepted. When MPKTV value is 
0.5, any reply is accepted, and the probability to receive a 
valid public key increases. As the number of attackers 
increases and becomes more than the number of nodes 
initially known, the probability of accepting corrupted public 
keys increases. 
Figure 5 shows the delay associated in receiving the reply 
to a CREQ in absence of any attacker node in the network. 
As the number of known nodes increases, the time required 
to receive a sufficient number of replies decreases to satisfy a 
given MPKTV. Moreover, the delay increases with MPKTV 
because of the increasing requirement for acceptance of a 
public key. However, a node that has many certifiers of its 
public key will be quickly authenticated even when the 
MPKTV is high. This is validated in Figure 5 as delay is 
found to decrease with increase in number of nodes known 
initially in the network. 
  
 
Figure 4(a). The acceptance rate of valid public key with 5 known nodes 
 
Figure 4(b). The acceptance rate of valid public key with 10 known nodes 
 
Figure 4(c). The acceptance rate of valid public key with 20 known nodes 
 
Figure 5. Delay is certification for varying number of known nodes 
` 
Figure 6. Performance in MANET attacked by a group of colluding nodes 
(MPKTV= 0.7 in  (a) and 0.9 in (b)) 
2. Colluding attackers: Finally, the proposed protocol is 
simulated in a scenario with colluding attacker nodes.  In 
Figure 6 (a) and Figure 6 (b), valid-x and corrupted-x denote 
the rate of acceptance of valid and corrupted certificates 
respectively when x nodes are known initially in the network. 
It may be observed that some corrupted public keys are 
accepted since a sufficient number of colluding attackers 
issue certificates for these corrupted public keys. With 
MPKTV = 0.9 the rate of acceptance of corrupted public 
keys is less but as expected, it increases with the number of 
attackers. Similarly, the rate of acceptance of valid 
certificates increases with the increase in the known nodes in 
the network. Nevertheless the increases are much more 
important when the number of known nodes goes from 5 to 
10 that for other increases. An interesting point to note is that 
with 20 nodes known to the source and the destination, the 
acceptance rate of corrupted certificates decreases even when 
the number of attackers increases from 30 to 40. This is 
because of the fact that when the network contains many 
attackers, source and destination are more likely to have 
known nodes in common. Since the common nodes are safe 
certifiers, with more common nodes in the network, higher is 
the probability of safe certificate exchange.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a key exchange protocol for MANETs is 
proposed that can be integrated with a routing protocol. The 
protocol is light-weight, efficient and alleviates the routing-
security interdependency cycle. Simulation results show that 
the protocol is resistant to isolated attack launched by 
malicious nodes that may introduce spurious certificates in 
the networks. It also performs well against cooperative 
attacks when sufficient level of trust exists among some 
nodes before the network deployment.   
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